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21 Dec 2022
Target Russia Capability, Not its Intent
1. NEGOTIATIONS AND CEASEFIRES WILL HELP RUSSIA TO BREAK UKRAINE’S MOMENTUM AND REGAIN INITIATIVE IN THE BATTLEFIELD
The West should stop expending resources trying to change a reality it does not control and focus on what it can shape plenty: denying Russia’s ability to wage a war against Ukraine.
Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of Ukraine’s statehood and identity.
2. KREMLIN'S INTENT TO CONTROL UKRAINE WILL LIKELY OUTLAST PUTIN, by design.
Putin is indoctrinating his goals into Russian formal structures, legislation, information space, and society.
3. RUSSIAN ELITES LARGELY SUBSCRIBE TO THIS INTENT, differing only in their approach.
4. POPULATION'S SUPPORT OF THE WAR population's explicit or tacit support of the war—will likely only grow as Kremlin propaganda intensifies
5. INTEGRATING TRANSDNISTRIAN AND BELORUSSIAN MILITARIES will result in dramatically different requirements on NATO
Kremlin could try to link its territorial gains beyond Ukraine by integrating other territories that Russia illegally occupies, such as Transnistria. This would impose dramatically different military posture requirements on NATO, which would be especially challenging if the US is required to act in the Pacific.
6. CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S CAPABILITY TO PURSUE ITS AGGRESSION IS THE ONLY APPROACH THAT HAS CHANGED KREMLIN'S BEHAVIOR IN THE PAST.
All the ground Russia lost in 2022 was the result of forcing Russia to abandon positions; none of it was the result of persuasion.
CONCLUSION:
The United States, Ukraine, and Ukraine's allies should focus on denying the following Russian capabilities, which are essential to Russia’s efforts to strip Ukraine of its statehood and national identity:
•Momentum
•Territory
•Core military capabilities
•Offset capabilities/ability to pivot
•Momentum.
Putin is trying to break Ukraine’s momentum because Russian forces need a breather to reconstitute if Russia is to hold existing and capture new territory in Ukraine.
If Putin manages to freeze the frontline—which a ceasefire or otherwise slowed Ukrainian counteroffensive would provide—he will have gained the time to at least partially reconstitute capabilities to pursue his unchanged goals of controlling Ukraine.
A breather would also lessen domestic pressures on Putin himself.
•Territory.
A military foothold in Ukraine is a core component of the Kremlin’s capability to launch future attacks. Such a foothold constitutes a permanent threat to Ukraine’s survival. Russia will use any territory it holds—especially in the strategically vital south of Ukraine—as a launchpad for attacks. Those territories would become Russia’s military bases—likely in perpetuity—if the fighting stops prematurely.
•Core military capabilities.
Putin is on a trajectory to further degrade Russia’s combat-capable manpower. Russian ability to produce and maintain heavy and advanced weapons one of the most essential dynamics of this war. Denying Russia’s military-industrial complex access to global markets is essential. Russia’s ability to source technology from Iran, China, and others is another element of Russia’s capability, which the West must curb.
•Offset capabilities.
The West must deny Russia the ability to regain the offensive in the information space. Information operations have been a core offset capability for the Kremlin. The more the Kremlin loses on the battlefield, the more Russia invests in perception manipulation—the prime example of which is the re-emergence of the ceasefire narrative. The West must learn this lesson and deny the Kremlin its ability to use perception manipulation to advance its goals.
RISKS OF ESCALATION WITH RUSSIA are a constant, and the United States should not self-deter—particularly while the Kremlin is relatively weaker. If the United States chooses to self-deter now, when Putin has limited leverage, it will always self-deter, including when the Kremlin is strong again.
Ukraine has crossed many of Putin’s supposed red lines, from liberating what Russia constitutionally claims to be its land to attacking the Crimean Bridge. Each time, the Kremlin did not escalate but rather reshaped its narrative to explain away its losses.
1. NEGOTIATIONS AND CEASEFIRES WILL HELP RUSSIA TO BREAK UKRAINE’S MOMENTUM AND REGAIN INITIATIVE IN THE BATTLEFIELD
The West should stop expending resources trying to change a reality it does not control and focus on what it can shape plenty: denying Russia’s ability to wage a war against Ukraine.
Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of Ukraine’s statehood and identity.
2. KREMLIN'S INTENT TO CONTROL UKRAINE WILL LIKELY OUTLAST PUTIN, by design.
Putin is indoctrinating his goals into Russian formal structures, legislation, information space, and society.
3. RUSSIAN ELITES LARGELY SUBSCRIBE TO THIS INTENT, differing only in their approach.
4. POPULATION'S SUPPORT OF THE WAR population's explicit or tacit support of the war—will likely only grow as Kremlin propaganda intensifies
5. INTEGRATING TRANSDNISTRIAN AND BELORUSSIAN MILITARIES will result in dramatically different requirements on NATO
Kremlin could try to link its territorial gains beyond Ukraine by integrating other territories that Russia illegally occupies, such as Transnistria. This would impose dramatically different military posture requirements on NATO, which would be especially challenging if the US is required to act in the Pacific.
6. CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S CAPABILITY TO PURSUE ITS AGGRESSION IS THE ONLY APPROACH THAT HAS CHANGED KREMLIN'S BEHAVIOR IN THE PAST.
All the ground Russia lost in 2022 was the result of forcing Russia to abandon positions; none of it was the result of persuasion.
CONCLUSION:
The United States, Ukraine, and Ukraine's allies should focus on denying the following Russian capabilities, which are essential to Russia’s efforts to strip Ukraine of its statehood and national identity:
•Momentum
•Territory
•Core military capabilities
•Offset capabilities/ability to pivot
•Momentum.
Putin is trying to break Ukraine’s momentum because Russian forces need a breather to reconstitute if Russia is to hold existing and capture new territory in Ukraine.
If Putin manages to freeze the frontline—which a ceasefire or otherwise slowed Ukrainian counteroffensive would provide—he will have gained the time to at least partially reconstitute capabilities to pursue his unchanged goals of controlling Ukraine.
A breather would also lessen domestic pressures on Putin himself.
•Territory.
A military foothold in Ukraine is a core component of the Kremlin’s capability to launch future attacks. Such a foothold constitutes a permanent threat to Ukraine’s survival. Russia will use any territory it holds—especially in the strategically vital south of Ukraine—as a launchpad for attacks. Those territories would become Russia’s military bases—likely in perpetuity—if the fighting stops prematurely.
•Core military capabilities.
Putin is on a trajectory to further degrade Russia’s combat-capable manpower. Russian ability to produce and maintain heavy and advanced weapons one of the most essential dynamics of this war. Denying Russia’s military-industrial complex access to global markets is essential. Russia’s ability to source technology from Iran, China, and others is another element of Russia’s capability, which the West must curb.
•Offset capabilities.
The West must deny Russia the ability to regain the offensive in the information space. Information operations have been a core offset capability for the Kremlin. The more the Kremlin loses on the battlefield, the more Russia invests in perception manipulation—the prime example of which is the re-emergence of the ceasefire narrative. The West must learn this lesson and deny the Kremlin its ability to use perception manipulation to advance its goals.
RISKS OF ESCALATION WITH RUSSIA are a constant, and the United States should not self-deter—particularly while the Kremlin is relatively weaker. If the United States chooses to self-deter now, when Putin has limited leverage, it will always self-deter, including when the Kremlin is strong again.
Ukraine has crossed many of Putin’s supposed red lines, from liberating what Russia constitutionally claims to be its land to attacking the Crimean Bridge. Each time, the Kremlin did not escalate but rather reshaped its narrative to explain away its losses.